Published:
Author: Pete Millea
At about 5:15 BST on Tuesday 24th June 1969 a collision occurred in dense fog in the Crosby Channel of the River Mersey off Askew Spit between the motor grab hopper Cressington of Liverpool and the motor vessel Hanneš Knüppel of Hamburg in the German Federal Republic. In Consequence of that collision the Cressington sank and one member of her crew lost his life.
The Cressington was under the command of Ronald Birrell Patterson, the holder of a Second Mate's Foreign Going Certificate of Competency and a Pilotage Certificate for the Rivery Mersey. Mr. Patterson has suffered for many years from Parkinsons disease, the effects of which were already making themselves apparent in 1954. One of these effects was that Mr. Patterson's speech became slurred. Mr. Patterson underwent a brain operation in May 1968, and this operation is said by his doctor to have had some beneficial effects, but it had no effect on his powers of speaking. His speech was too slurred for him to take the examination for a radiotelephone operator's certificate of proficiency. The medical evidence was that in January 1964 Mr. Patterson was difficult to understand. His own doctor gave evidence that he was very difficult to understand even before the accident, and that he was not suitable to act as captain. Mr. Patterson had very great difficulty in giving his evidence to this Court. After making all due allowance for the fact that Mr. Patterson may have felt nervous in strange surroundings, and bearing well in mind the evidence that Mr. Patterson's condition has deteriorated as a result of the distress he has felt following the collision, the Court firmly holds the view that quite apart from the breach of the Radio Rules it was wrong to send the Cressington to sea with no officer on board other than Mr. Patterson. The Court, however, agrees with the submission made by Counsel on behalf of the owners of the Cressington that neither the collision nor the subsequent loss of life was causally connected to Mr. Patterson's infirmity.
On the morning of the 24th June 1969 the predicted time of high water at Liverpool was 06.16 BST. The collision occurred about an hour before high water at which time the tide in the Crosby Channel was flooding with the force of between half and one knot. Various estimates of the force and direction of the wind were given in evidence. The Court has come to the conclusion that there was a light breeze from the north-west. The Court is also satisfied that the dense fog in which the collision took place was a comparatively narrow bank of fog, the densest part of which was probably about a mile wide and becoming less dense on its fringes.
Cressington
The Cressington was proceeding down the Crosby Channel at a speed of about 10 knots through the water, and it is admitted that no steps were taken to reduce speed before the collision. The Cressington was struck on her port side about in way of frame 32 by the stem of the Hanneš Knüppel at an angle between the vessels of about a right angle. The Hanneš Knüppel was making about 8 knots through the water at the moment of collision, with the result that her stem penetrated about 10 feet into the Cressington.
We turn now to the navigation of the Hanneš Knüppel. She proceeded from the Bar Light Vessel into the Queen's Channel at a speed of not less than 12 knots through the water. The Hanneš Knüppel passed the Formby Float to port, at which time the visibility had deteriorated but was still about one and a half miles. When she reached buoy Q17 visibility was further reduced and was estimated to have been about six cables. At that stage Pilot Webber suggested to the mate who was then on the bridge, the master being below, that the speed of the Hanneš Knüppel should be reduced. The mate preferred to maintain full speed and to this suggestion Pilot Webber agreed because, as he put it, "I did not see any reason why we should not still go on at full speed". It is regrettable that a pilot with such long experience as Pilot Webber did not insist on a proper reduction in speed. By the time that the Hanneš Knüppel passed buoy C1 the visibility had further deteriorated to approximately two cables. Pilot Webber gave an order for the engines to be reduced to slow speed ahead and for a signal of one prolonged blast to be sounded on the whistle of the Hanneš Knüppel. Both orders were complied with. The Hanneš Knüppel was proceeding on a course of 095° towards buoy C3. At about this time Pilot Webber glanced at the radar and saw an echo about half a mile or a little more ahead. The radar set was being operated on a six mile scale, which made accurate observation of distances and bearings of objects which were close exceedingly difficult. Pilot Webber did not remain at the radar long enough fully to assess the situation, but he was left with the impression that the echo which he saw was of a vessel on the starboard side of the Channel and that he must therefore be overtaking it rapidly. From this he concluded that the vessel was either proceeding very slowly or had stopped altogether due to the adverse weather conditions. On rounding buoy C3 Pilot Webber decided to steer five degrees to port of the course appropriate to take him to buoy C5 in order to draw out towards the middle of the Channel and to pick up the ship ahead on his starboard bow. On reflection he decided to haul out to port by a further two degrees. He told us that this order to the helmsman was to steer 098°. It was his evidence that the Hanneš Knüppel was on this course when her mate sighted the Cressington right ahead. When Pilot Webber heard the mate say "There she is" he moved to the starboard side of the helmsman from which position he sighted the bow wave of the Cressington in line with the stem of the Hanneš Knüppel, and when he saw the hull of the Cressington she appeared to be crossing his course at an angle of about 45 degrees. He estimated the distance between the two vessels at the moment of sighting as being somewhere between one and two cables.
Hanneš Knüppel
On board the Cressington, the order hard-astarboard was given at the moment when the Hanneš Knüppel was sighted. When it was apparent that a collision would not be avoided the order hard-a-port was given in an attempt to throw the stern clear and lessen the impact. We have some doubts as to whether this order was carried out before the collision. It is the evidence of Pilot Webber that when he sighted the Cressington ahead he gave the order hard-a-starboard and full speed astern. It is, however, apparent from the relative positions of the vessels at the moment of sighting that thereafter the Hanneš Knüppel must have swung to port because if this were not so, firstly there could not have been a collision and, secondly the vessels would not have collided at a right angle. Pilot Webber maintained for some time that his ship did not swing to port before the collision but before the completion of his evidence he had, with some reluctance, agreed that in fact his vessel must have come to port. The Court does not doubt that in the situation in which Pilot Webber found himself on sighting the Cressington he gave the order "hard-a-starboard".
The immediate causes of this collision are quite plain. The master of the Cressington, Mr. Patterson, was at fault for ordering his helmsman to leave the Crosby Light Float to starboard and thereafter for allowing the Cressington to remain on the wrong side of the Channel. When the visibility deteriorated he ought to have taken immediate steps to get on to his correct side of the Channel and, having done so, to have reduced speed as was appropriate to the extent of the visibility. When he heard the whistle signal of a ship ahead he ought immediately to have stopped the engines in order to give himself more time and a better opportunity to appreciate the situation. There was an unexplained fault in his observation of the radar in that at no stage before the collision was the echo of the Hanneš Knüppel seen, although his radar set was apparently operating efficiently on the three mile range. It is clear that Mr. Patterson is deserving of the strongest possible censure.
The Hanneš Knüppel was proceeding up the Channel at an excessive speed in the weather conditions prevailing after passing buoy Q17. Pilot Webber allowed himself to be over-persuaded by the mate of the Hanneš Knüppel and relied upon scanty information from the radar set from which he drew a wrong inference. Although the Court is satisfied that the Hanneš Knüppel altered her heading substantially to port and swung out towards the centre of the Channel before collision, the Court is satisfied that this swing to port was not the result of any wrong action on the part of Pilot Webber. Nevertheless for the faults in navigation enumerated above the Court cannot do other than be critical of Pilot Webber. The master and mate of the Hanneš Knüppel have not been heard in their own defence and it is for this reason and this reason only that the Court feels inhibited from expressing any view as to their conduct.
As a result of the collision a deep gash extending below water level was cut through the port side plating of the Cressington into her engine room space. The port side hydraulic ram was also cut and this opened three cargo doors on the port side aft, with the result that most of the silt was discharged, thereby reducing her draught by about five feet. The chief engineer was in the engine room at the time of the collision, and when he saw the inrush of water he immediately gave orders for the pumps to be started. Within a few minutes it became obvious that the inflow of water greatly exceeded the capacity of the pumps. The chief engineer appreciated that the engine room space would be filled and that in consequence the engines would stop and that the vessel would probably sink. He therefore went up to the bridge and advised Mr. Patterson to beach the Cressington.
In giving evidence to this Court Mr. Patterson said that he thought the chief engineer was exaggerating, but he could not explain why he thought this because he did not take any active steps to investigate the situation for himself. He had already given the order "back to Garston", but he said in evidence that he did not expect to reach Garston. He gave no rational explanation for his action in steaming back up the Crosby Channel in a ship, the engines of which would have to be stopped suddenly at some indeterminate time when the water rose to the appropriate level. At this time the Cressington was only a few cables from the Askew Spit which is well known to Mr. Patterson. If Mr. Patterson found himself unable to accept the advice of his chief engineer he ought to have proceeded out of the Channel and stopped in comparatively shallow water on the Askew Spit, if necessary at anchor, until he had inspected the damage for himself. In this position there would have been plenty of water to remain afloat if the pumps could control the inflow; but if on the other hand he found that his vessel was bound to sink he could take her into water sufficiently shallow for her bridge to remain above water when she sank. Such action would have ensured the safety of his crew, and it would have made easier the task of refloating the Cressington. The Court takes the view that it was a grave error of judgment on the part of Mr. Patterson to proceed up Channel with so little knowledge of the condition of his ship. Mr. Patterson had disregarded proper advice and deprived himself of the knowledge which he needed to make a reasonable decision. The consequences might have been much more serious than they were.
The Court also takes the view that it was wrong for Mr. Patterson to steam up the Channel without informing the Base Station at Garston Dock of his intentions, and without calling another vessel to accompany him. If Mr. Patterson really expected to beach the Cressington, as he told the Court, then he ought in the interests of the safety of his crew to have taken the precaution of letting this be known to the outside world.
While the Cressington was sinking her lifeboat was safely launched on the starboard quarter. It was boarded by Seaman Thomas Millea. The boat was being held close to the stern of the Cressington when she sank. At this time the lifeboat capsized and threw Millea into the water. There is no satisfactory evidence as to why the lifeboat capsized; possibly her painter was still made fast to the Cressington, although there was some evidence to the effect that it had been cast off; possibly the turbulence caused by the Cressington as she turned over to port and sank was a contributory factor. There is no suggestion that the capsizing of the lifeboat was the result of fault on the part of anyone. After the lifeboat capsized seven members of the crew of the Cressington clung to the upturned boat until they were rescued by the Maythorn. Thomas Millea was wearing a Board of Trade lifejacket when he was thrown into the water, but unhappily he had omitted to tie it correctly with the result that it slipped and did not hold his head completely above water. Mr. Patterson who was not wearing a lifejacket went to the assistance of Millea and did everything humanly possible to save him. Eventually Patterson and Millea were taken aboard the W.D. Mersey, but Millea died from asphyxia due to drowning. The regret which is felt by the Court at having to criticise Mr. Patterson for his short-comings already mentioned is matched by its pleasure in recording the gallantry of Mr. Patterson in trying, albeit unsuccessfully, to save the life of Thomas Patrick Millea.
It is also with pleasure that the Court places on record the appreciation of all concerned for the action of the master of the Maythorn in going to the assistance of the crew of the Cressington immediately he noticed her predicament. It was fortunate for the crew of the Cressington that the Maythorn happened to be proceeding up the Channel in the vicinity of the Cressington when she sank.
This collision was brought about by a failure on the part of those responsible for the navigation of both vessels to observe the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea. We have little doubt that these officers would have observed the Collision Regulations but for the fact that they placed reliance upon radar, the information from which led them into thinking erroneously that they could depart from their obligations under those Regulations with impunity.
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